# THE END OF THE BEGINNING: THE PEB RECOMMENDATIONS

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The Academic Senate has not yet developed a response to the PEB recommendations, so any opinions expressed should be interpreted as the views only of the authors of these slides.

#### THREE BIG PROBLEMS

- Substantial unfunded liabilities
  - UCRP
  - Retiree Health
- Uncompetitive salaries
- The UC Budget: Inadequate State support

How will the PEB Recommendations help with these problems??

#### THE UNFUNDED LIABILITIES

- UCRP has an unfunded liability of \$12.9 Billion (7/01/09) due to 20 years of no contributions to the Plan whose annual normal cost is 17.6%.
- Restarting contributions is overdue and absolutely necessary.
- A long-term financing plan is needed.
- Reducing Benefits? No effect on unfunded liability, only on "normal cost" for future benefits.

#### UNCOMPETITIVE SALARIES

- UC salaries are below market averages for nearly all employee groups.
- Competitive benefits help, to varying degrees by different employee groups.
- Total remuneration is still uncompetitive
- Cutting benefits therefore further erodes our competitiveness.

# THE UC BUDGET AND DECLINING STATE SUPPORT (1)

- State support is inadequate and far from historical levels, posing a direct threat to UC's excellence.
- Alternative revenue sources are welcome and critical, but there should be no illusions about their potential to fully replace state support.
- The current budget situation cannot be an excuse to delay dealing with the unfunded liability.
  - The unfunded liability grows at 7.5% annually.
  - \$2 of non-state contributions are lost for every \$1 of state contributions that are not made.

# THE UC BUDGET AND DECLINING STATE SUPPORT (2)

- Retiree health cuts cannot fix the operating budget.
  - We do not "pre-fund" retiree health.
- The unfunded liability means that it will be 20 years before benefits cuts could make a difference in UC's operating budget.
- Developing a long-term plan for benefits is critical, but the report misses an opportunity to document the need for competitiveness.
- Benefits cuts are not a solution to the budget problem.

#### WHAT WOULD BE EFFECTIVE?

- Providing incentives to delay retirement
  - Eligibility changes for retiree health benefits
  - Increases in targeted retirement ages
- A long-term financing strategy that recognizes that we cannot invest the problem away
- Achieving competitive total remuneration is required for UC excellence
  - Faculty and Staff need salary increases with current benefits
  - We need even greater salary increases to compensate for reduced benefits to remain where we are now

#### DEFINITELY NOT EFFECTIVE

- New tier plans have
  - No effect on accrued pension liability.
  - Little effect on future liability for years.
  - No effect on the operating budget for 20 years.
- It is impossible to build or maintain a great University by paying faculty and staff 85 cents on the dollar.
- Savings from cutting benefits are illusory.

### THE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION

- What effect will the actions we take now have on our excellence over the next few years and the next few decades?
- Our heirs may be glad we did not prolong the 20% employer contribution any longer than necessary.
  - But they will have to wait until 2030 for the first 1% reduction in employer costs.
  - •By then the damage to the University will likely be irreversible.
- More likely, our heirs will be glad we did everything we could to preserve UC's excellence through competitive total remuneration.

### RETIREE HEALTH OPTIONS

- Structured to incentivize retirement at a later age
- Reduce UC's maximum contribution to 70% of premiums
- Eligibility for maximum contribution requires age 65 and 20 years service
  - Half at age 60 (i.e. 35% of premium)
  - Reduced by service years < 20, also linearly</p>
- We need to be looking at pre-funding, which reduces the GASB liability
- Affordability for retirees

### THE PENSION OPTIONS: COSTS

Proposed Plan- Age Factor	Estimated Long-Term Total Normal Cost	Member Contribution Rate(s)	Estimated Long-Term Employer Normal Cost		
	Integrated with So	ocial Secruity			
Option A – 1.5%/3.0%	11.9%	3.5% / 9.5%	7.3%		
Option B – 2.0%/3.0%	13.8%	4.0% / 8.2%	9.0%		
Not Integrated with Social Security					
<b>Option C – 2.50%</b>	15.1%	6.1%	9.0%		

The slashes indicate the break point of Social Security Covered Compensation (SSCC) which is currently around \$60K and rises over time with wages.

### PAY REPLACEMENT AT AGE 65, 30 YEARS OF SERVICE, INCLUDING SOCIAL SECURITY AVERAGE MEMBER RATES UNDER NEW TIER DESIGNS ALSO SHOWN



Based on the above member rates, the long-term employer normal cost of the new tier designs is 7.3% of compensation for Design A and 9.0% of compensation for Designs B and C. Assumes retirement in 2010 and past salary increases of 4% per year

Benefits for Current UCRP and possible new tier designs are based on three-year HAPC; replacement ratio is expressed as a percentage of final year pay
Current UCRP benefits include \$133 offset to HAPC for Coordinated Members (with a corresponding supplement until age 65); new tier designs exclude the offset and supplement
Member rates shown for new tier plan designs A and B are averages for a calendar year; first rate applies to pay below Social Security Covered Compensation
(about \$60,000 in 2010 and is the average of the Social Security Wage Base for the 35 years ending in that year) and the second rate applies to pay above \$5, Covered Comp

### THE PENSION OPTIONS: AN ILLUSTRATION

Pension Alternatives with Retirement:

Age = 60 Years of Service = 30

HAPC	UCRP	Option A	Option B	Option C
\$60,000	\$45,000	\$19,440	\$25,920	\$32,400
	(75%)	(32%)	(42%)	(54%)
\$90,000	\$67,500	\$38,880	\$43,740	\$48,600
	(75%)	(43%)	(49%)	(54%)
\$120,000	\$90,000	\$58,320	\$64,800	\$64,800
	(75%)	(49%)	(54%)	(54%)

**%HAPC** is shown in parentheses

### THE PENSION OPTIONS: AN ILLUSTRATION

Pension Alternatives with Retirement:

Age = 65 Years of Service = 30

HAPC	UCRP	Option A	Option B	Option C
\$60,000	\$45,000	\$27,000	\$36,000	\$45,000
	(75%)	(45%)	(60%)	(75%)
\$90,000	\$67,500	\$54,000	\$60,750	\$67,500
	(75%)	(60%)	(68%)	(75%)
\$120,000	\$90,000	\$81,000	\$90,000	\$90,000
	(75%)	(68%)	(75%)	(75%)

%HAPC is shown in parentheses

## COMPETITIVENESS OF THE OPTIONS

Employee Group	Current UCRP With 5% Contributions	Option A	Option B	Option C
Overall	+10%	-43%	<b>-27</b> %	-22%
Ladder Rank Faculty	-8%	-41%	-30%	-26%
Senior Management Group	+19%	-6%	-2%	+2%
Librarians & Other Academics	+50%	-19%	+5%	+13%
Management & Senior Professionals	+24%	-33%	-17%	-14%
Professional & Support Staff— Policy Covered	+25%	-52%	-30%	-22%
Professional & Support Staff— Represented	+25%	-54%	-31%	-25%
Service Workers	+43%	-43% 	-17%	-8%


### Options A, B, and C: Comparisons to Market and to Current Benefits, for

Faculty and	l Policy-Cov	ered Staff
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	Group/			Total	Total	
Cash	Comp. Lag	Retirement	Retiree Health	Retirement	Remuneration	
	<u>Cı</u>	<u>ırrent UCRP wit</u>	h 5% employee o	<u>contributions</u>		
Faculty	-10%	-8%	+56%	+2%	-6%	
PSS-PC	-13%	+27%	+485%	+85%	-2%	
	<u>Option</u> A	1: 1.5%/3% with	3.5%/9.5% emp	<u>loyee contributio</u>	<u>ons</u>	
Faculty	-10%	-41%	-3%	-36%	-11%	
PSS-PC	-13%	-52%	+212%	-18%	-11%	
	Option B: 2%/3% with 4%/8.2% employee contributions					
Faculty	-10%	-30%	-3%	-26%	-9%	
PSS-PC	-13%	-30%	+212%	+1%	-9%	
Option C: "UCRP Lite" with 6.1% employee contributions						
Faculty	-10%	-26%	-3%	-23%	-9%	
PSS-PC	-13%	-22%	+212%	+8% 9/30/10	-8% 16	

### IDENTICAL EMPLOYER CONTRIBUTIONS FOR OPTIONS A, B, OR C, THROUGH 2029

Employer Contribution: ARC starting FYB2011 or Modified Ramp Up



<sup>\*</sup> Assumes new tier in place by FYB2013, 7% contribution for employees that stay in the current UCRP plan

### DISSENTING STATEMENT-1

- No pension plan should be adopted if it is competitive only after future hypothetical salary increases.
- 2. Option A is unacceptable because it would not be competitive even if the salary gap were closed.
- 3. Options B and C could be competitive if the salary gap is closed.
- 4. It can be argued that Option C is superior to Option B for simplicity and transparency.

#### DISSENTING STATEMENT-2

- 5. If "Choice" between remaining in UCRP or joining a new tier is implemented, the employee contribution for UCRP should not exceed 7%.
- 6. We oppose attempts to undermine the Total Remuneration studies and their results.
- 7. We support the cuts in Retiree Health described in the Report but oppose any further cuts in this area.
- 8. We support steps proposed and taken to put UCRP on a sounder financial footing.

### BUDGET CONCLUSION: THE UNFUNDED LIABILITY

- The budget problem (and potential shrinkage of work force) arises from the unfunded liability, which we have no way to reduce.
- A new tier will initially apply to only a few people, so there is little reduction in future liability early on in any Option.
- Borrowing from STIP\* (at 2.5-3%) to address the unfunded liability results in *identical* effects of Options A, B, and C on the operating budget for two decades.

\*STIP = Short Term Investments Pool

### BUDGET CONCLUSION: THE OPERATING BUDGET

- Under Option A, there will be fewer employees, and there might be layoffs.
- Since they cost the same until 2030, Options B and C will not cause any additional layoffs.
- Option A could even cause more harm, since it requires higher salaries just to match Options B and C in total remuneration.
- Option A cannot be competitive unless salaries move to levels above market.

#### SOME FINAL THOUGHTS

- Integration with Social Security is not an overriding goal and has disadvantages, among which is complexity.
- What matters is total remuneration!
- How to formulate a better strategy?
  - LAO call for long-term financing plan
  - The PEB Task Force Report is a missed opportunity to make the case for remaining competitive and for UC excellence.
- "Sustainability" vs. Quality

### TOTAL REM WITH COMPETITIVE SALARIES

Results when cash compensation is increased to market (e.g., ~10% average increase for Ladder Rank Faculty and ~18% average increase for staff)

	Option A	Option B	Option C
Pension Market Value			
LRF	-32%	-21%	-18%
Staff (All Segments)	-32%	-9%	+2%
<b>Total Remuneration Resul</b>			
LRF	-2%	-1%	-0.8%
Staff (All Segments)	+2%	+3%	+4%